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The Sword of Damocles:
Revisiting the Question of Whether the United Nations
Security Council is Bound by International Law
Joy Gordon *

Abstract
This Article considers whether the United Nations Security Council is bound by
international humanitarian law in the context of Chapter VII, which authorizes the Council
to use force in response to aggression, threats to peace, and breaches of the peace. In the early
1990s, the Council took unprecedented measures that were seen by many as overreaching,
raising the possibility that the leading institution of global governance might abuse its power.
At the present moment, it seems that the matter is resolved politically and judicially. But it is
not resolved constitutionally, and the abuse of power by the Security Council remains a
possibility. If, in the future, a permanent member of the Council comes to hold considerable
political and economic influence over the other permanent members, as was the case in the early
1990s, the possibility of an extraordinary abuse of power within the Security Council again
becomes viable.
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I. I NTRODUCTION
The early 1990s saw a dramatic increase in the activism of the United
Nations Security Council. It was an extraordinary moment in the history of the
Council, as the paralysis that had characterized it throughout the Cold War had
ended. For the first time since its inception, it was possible for the Council to act
assertively and consensually, particularly in the context of Chapter VII, which
authorizes the Council to respond to aggression, breaches of the peace, and
threats to the peace. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its
replacement by Russia, there was no counterweight on the Council to the US
and its allies. At the same time, a type of overreaching that had been anticipated
at the formation of the United Nations, but had never before come close to
actualization, became possible. Now, for the first time in human history, there
was an institution of global governance that, in Chapter VII, had a mandate
whose boundaries were uncertain, whose will would be implemented by virtually
every nation on earth, and whose machinery could now be put in motion.
Starting in 1990, a number of the Council’s activities raised serious
questions about whether its acts exceeded the scope of its mandate: if the United
Nations Charter gave the Council such extensive powers “in order to ensure
prompt and effective action,” 1 how do we make sense of the fact that this body
invoked Chapter VII to create tribunals, which have continued for years after
the crisis passed? What do we make of a situation where the Council punished a
nation despite the fact that the nation was complying fully with its obligations
under international law? How are we to make sense of a set of measures
imposed by the Council in the name of stopping aggression and human rights

1

UN Charter Art 24, ¶ 1.
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violations, measures which themselves brought about the widespread suffering
of an entire civilian population?
In response to the Council’s activism of the early 1990s, a critical question
was articulated again and again: is the Security Council bound by law, exempt
from law, or is it the ultimate arbiter of its own legality? This question was raised
at the inception of the United Nations, was rarely of interest for the next forty
years, and then became of matter of profound concern and urgency for a
decade. 2 It seems now that the question is comfortably resolved. While
international judicial bodies do not have direct judicial review, they have
nevertheless spoken to the issue on several occasions and have been increasingly
explicit in maintaining that the Council is bound by international law. 3 Likewise,
current legal scholarship consistently recognizes a broad consensus regarding the
particular principles of law that are binding on the Council. Politically, within the
Council, there is no longer the unchallenged hegemony that characterized the
early 1990s; consequently, the kind of overreaching that triggered concerns
within the international community is no longer possible. 4 It would thus seem
that the matter has been largely settled.
But it has not been resolved. It is not a matter controlled by legal
scholarship, judicial dictum, or the politics of the moment. The question is a
constitutional one, and it is as relevant now as it was in 1990, when every
country in the world was obliged to participate in denying Iraq access to basic
necessities, including food and potable water, until that strangulation brought
about the deaths of infants and young children, as well as the collapse of every
major system necessary to support human life. 5 It is fully conceivable that there
may arise another historical moment in which one of the permanent members of
the Council holds such extraordinary political and economic sway that none of
the other permanent members are in a position to oppose its will. At the same
time, the notions of aggression, breaches of the peace, and threats to the
peace—the core of Chapter VII—lend themselves to interpretation of
extraordinary breadth, arguably including anything from domestic civil rights
violations to global climate change. However, as the venue for that
argumentation, the Security Council is critically limited, its objectivity utterly
precarious, and its judgment easily distorted by political machinations. At the
same time, the stakes are high; at its extreme, the question is whether the
Security Council, in the name of stopping aggression, can itself commit
genocide. When we add to this the provision that every member state must
2

See Section II.

3
4

See Section IV.C.
See Section IV.A.2.

5

See Section III.A.2.
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implement measures imposed by the Council in accordance with Chapter VII 6
and that a state’s obligations under the Charter override any other international
treaty obligations, 7 we find ourselves looking at the possibility of an atrocity of a
magnitude that simply staggers the imagination.
In this Article, I revisit the question of whether the Security Council is
bound by law. In contrast to previous approaches, this Article does so by
looking at the history of the question: who anticipated it; who dismissed it; when
the question was irrelevant; when the question was a matter of life and death;
why the question is still a live one long after it seems to have been resolved in a
smooth and tidy fashion; and why it is an enduring constitutional concern. If the
Council in fact is not restrained by international law—or is not restrained
sufficiently and clearly—then, like the sword of Damocles, an abuse of power by
this institution hangs in the air as a continuing possibility.

II. T HE H ISTORY OF THE Q UESTION
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter authorizes the Security Council
to address aggression, breaches of the peace, and threats to the peace. It
provides that the Council “shall determine the existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,” and that the Council will also
decide what measures to take, in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, “to
maintain or restore international peace and security.” 8 Articles 41 and 42 provide
that the Council’s actions under Chapter VII “may include” an array of
measures:
Article 41: The Security Council may decide what measures not involving
the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and
it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such
measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic
relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
Article 42: Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for
in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may
take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain
or restore international peace and security. Such action may include
demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of
Members of the United Nations. 9

It is striking that Chapter VII contains no explicit limits on the Council’s
Chapter VII powers. However, there are arguably other provisions of the
6

UN Charter Art 25.

7
8

Id at Art 103.
Id at Art 39.

9

Id at Arts 41, 42.
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Charter that do. Most significantly, Article 24(2) provides that “[i]n discharging
these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and
Principles of the United Nations.” 10 However, these “Purposes and Principles”
are general statements that do not contain any clear limits on the Security
Council.
This did not escape notice when the United Nations was established at the
San Francisco Convention in 1948, nor in the preparatory documents. In the
1945 conference that formulated the United Nations Charter, the Conference on
International Organisation, a number of delegations proposed amendments that
would more explicitly articulate the Council’s limits and obligations. 11 Others
were concerned that the Council would function as the overriding source of law
in Chapter VII situations, such that it would be exempt from other forms of
international law. 12 Many of the smaller nations pressed for more limits on the
Council. These proposals were consistently rejected by the Great Powers that
were to become the permanent members of the Council. For instance, Article 1
provided that peaceful settlement of disputes would be “in conformity with the
principles of justice and international law.” The Norwegian delegate proposed an
amendment to include the same language in regard to the use of force, stating
that “no solution should be imposed upon a State of a nature to impair its
confidence in its future security or welfare.” 13 Mexico also wanted the language
included. However, the UK and US delegates argued that this was unnecessary
in light of the reference to justice and international law in the principles of the
Charter. 14 The Ukrainian delegate maintained that the language concerning
justice and international law had already been accepted by the committee, and

10
11

UN Charter Art 24, ¶ 2.
Dapo Akande, The International Court of Justice and the Security Council: Is There Room for Judicial Control
of Decisions of the Political Organs of the United Nations?, 46 Intl & Comp L Q 309, 315 (1997), citing
Doc 881 III/3 146, 12 UNCIO Docs 504–5 (1945).

12

Mohammed Bedjaoui, The New World Order and the Security Council: Testing the Legality of Its Acts 1
(Martinus Nijhoff 1994). Bedjaoui states that:
the idea that the Security Council creates and imposes its own law raises [the
question of] whether the Security Council, when operating in ‘lawmaker
mode’, is exempted from the requirement to respect, on the one hand, the
provisions of the United Nations Charter and, on the other, the rules and
principles of international law. There is nothing new about these vital
questions. They were raised at a theoretical level at the San Francisco
Conference.
Id.

13

Akande, 46 Intl & Comp L Q at 319 (cited in note 11), citing Doc 555 III/1/27, 11 UNCIO
Docs 378 (1945).

14

Id.
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the US delegate maintained that this was an adequate response to Mexico’s
concern. 15
Additionally, no form of judicial review was acceptable to the Great
Powers. Belgium proposed that disputes over interpretation of the Charter
should be submitted to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), but the proposal
was rejected.16 At the San Francisco Conference in 1948, the crucial decision was
made not to set up a specific mechanism for interpreting the Charter; instead,
each organ of the United Nations would interpret the provisions relevant to its
work. 17 Consequently, the Security Council would judge for itself whether its
acts were authorized by the Charter.
This is a particular concern in light of Articles 25 and 103. Article 25
establishes a mechanism of global enforcement with enormous reach: every
member state of the United Nations is required to participate in the
implementation of Chapter VII measures. 18 Article 103 is equally significant: “In
the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other
international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall
prevail.” 19 Consequently, a member state is required to implement Chapter VII
measures, even if this requires the state to violate its other treaty obligations.
Thus, there is good cause to ask not only whether the Charter created
unprecedented machinery for coordinating global use of force, but also whether
this machinery did not at the same time establish unprecedented possibilities for
the abuse of power.
Does Chapter VII provide a blank check for the Council to do however it
sees fit? Certainly the Security Council is not bound by international law in the
same way that a state is. A state is only permitted to use force in self-defense, 20
whereas the Council is permitted to intervene militarily in a broader range of
circumstances. 21 While Article 2 of the Charter affirms the sovereignty of all
member nations without providing for any exceptions, 22 a military intervention
15
16
17
18

19

Id at 320.
Bedjaoui, New World Order at 9–10 (cited in note 12).
Id at 10.
UN Charter Art 25 (“The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the
decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”).
Id at Art 103.

21

Id at Art 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”).
Id at Arts 39–51.

22

UN Charter Art 2, ¶ 1.

20
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under Chapter VII clearly violates the territorial integrity of a state. Collective
sanctions in general “cannot but override other principles and rules of
international law such as non-interference in internal affairs, sovereignty . . . and
freedom of trade and navigation.” 23
Still, the Charter includes language that may provide some limitations on
the Security Council’s powers. This occurs primarily in Article 24(2), in
conjunction with Article 1. Article 24(2) provides that “[i]n discharging these
duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and
Principles of the United Nations.” 24 Under Article 1, among the principles and
purposes of the United Nations are:
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to
the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of
the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the
principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the
peace. 25

While Articles 25 and 103 do not contain explicit boundaries, it could be
said that limits can also be inferred from their language. Article 25 provides that
“The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the
decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.” 26 Similarly,
Article 103 states that the members’ “obligations under the present Charter shall
prevail.” 27 These clauses could arguably be taken to mean that the member states
are obligated to carry out only those acts of the Security Council that are in
accordance with the Charter, implying that it is possible for Security Council
measures to be ultra vires or otherwise in violation of the Charter. This view is
contained in an early ICJ case, which held that “[t]he political character of an
organ cannot release it from the observance of the treaty provisions established
by the Charter when they constitute limitations on its powers or criteria for its
judgment.” 28
After the Charter was adopted, there were occasions on which legal
scholars or international bodies maintained in broad terms that the United
23

24
25
26
27
28

Nico Schrijver, The Use of Economic Sanctions by the UN Security Council: An International Law
Perspective, in Harry H.G. Post, ed, International Economic Law and Armed Conflict 123, 124 (Martinus
Nijhoff 1994).
UN Charter Art 24, ¶ 2.
Id at Art 1.
Id at Art 25 (emphasis added).
Id at Art 103 (emphasis added).
Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter), Advisory
Opinion, 1948 ICJ 57, 64 (May 28, 1948).
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Nations and its organs were rooted in international law. For example, in 1949 a
draft declaration of the International Law Commission stated that “[w]hereas a
primary purpose of the United Nations is the maintenance of international peace
and security, . . . the reign of law and justice is essential to the realization of that
purpose.” 29 However, in none of these sources is it clear exactly where the
boundaries of the Council’s mandate lie, much less what body would judge or
enforce those boundaries. Indeed, shortly after the founding of the United
Nations, some maintained that the Security Council was a source of law, not
itself subject to the law, or was in some other way exempt. In 1950, John Foster
Dulles maintained:
The Security Council is not a body that merely enforces agreed law. It is a
law unto itself. If it considers any situation as a threat to the peace, it may
decide what measures shall be taken. No principles of law are laid down to
guide it; it can decide in accordance with what it thinks is expedient. 30

The following year, the eminent jurist Hans Kelsen similarly held that “[t]he
purpose of the enforcement action under Article 39 is not: to maintain or restore
the law, but to maintain, or restore peace, which is not necessarily identical with
the law.” 31
Among legal scholars, the issue of limitations on institutions of global
governance, in particular the possibility of judicial review, was revisited time and
again in the decades that followed the establishment of the United Nations, with
varied results. In 1950, the Grotius Society conducted a study, The Problem of
Redress Against the Decisions of International Organisations. Their rapporteur, André
Gros, found that “[t]here is a crying need for judicial redress. States should be
able to protect their rights by obtaining the annulment by an impartial tribunal
of any decision of an organization which is ultra vires or represents an abuse of
power.” 32 However, the Grotius Society refused to endorse these findings, on
the grounds that the political organs of international bodies could be paralyzed
by such an arrangement and that international judicial bodies could be
overwhelmed with complaints. 33
In 1952, at the Sienna Session of the Institut de Droit International, one
commentator noted that most members were in favor of some form of judicial
29

30

Kenneth Manusama, The United Nations Security Council in the Post-Cold War Era: Applying the Principle
of Legality 16 (Martinus Nijhoff 2006), citing International Law Commission, Draft Declaration on
Rights and Duties of States, UN Doc A/CN.4/2, preamble (Dec 15, 1948).
John Foster Dulles, War or Peace 194–95 (MacMillan 1950).

31

Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems 294
(Fredrick A. Praeger 1st ed 1950).

32

Bedjaoui, New World Order at 58 (cited in note 12), paraphrasing André Gros, et al, The Problem of
Redress Against the Decisions of International Organisations, 36 Transacts Grotius Socy 30, 30–31 (1950).

33

Bedjaoui, New World Order at 57–58 (cited in note 12).
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review for international political bodies. 34 However, the British legal scholar
Wilfred Jenks argued persuasively that it was too soon in the United Nation’s
history to have any real concerns about the need for judicial review and that the
risk of frivolous complaints would restrict governance bodies from taking
effective action.35 The Institut concluded its deliberations with the modest
suggestion that the possibility of judicial review should remain open. 36 At the
Amsterdam Session in 1957, the Institut revisited the question, finding that the
possibility of judicial review depended on the particular structure of each
organization: “[I]t is only via conventional provisions or other instruments
specific to each organ or organization that, as matters stand at present, it seems
practicable to lay down rules to cover such review, the remedies it implies and the
effects it would have.” 37 Thus, among scholars of international law in the decade
following the United Nation’s inception, while there were occasional concerns
about the possibility of abuses of power by organizations of global governance,
these concerns tended to be overridden by a hesitation to impose measures that
would burden the international judiciary or restrain the ability of the
organizations to take effective action.
Outside the scholarly community, the issue received little attention.
However, there were a handful of occasions on which international bodies
addressed the question of the limits of the Council’s powers in some form. In
1962, the United Nations General Assembly requested an advisory opinion
regarding the costs of two United Nations operations: one established by the
General Assembly in the Mideast and the other put in place by the Security
Council in the Congo. The General Assembly requested guidance as to whether
these could be considered “expenses of the Organization,” which under Article
17 could then be charged to the member states. 38 The ICJ noted that when an
organ of the United Nations is acting to achieve one of the purposes stated in
the Charter, such as when the Security Council is taking action toward “the goal
of international peace and security . . . the presumption is that such action is not
ultra vires the Organization.” 39 Thus, while the ICJ recognized the possibility that
the Council could act outside the scope of its authority, at the same time it

34

Id at 58.

35

Id at 58–59.
Id at 58–60.

36
37

Bedjaoui, New World Order at 60 (cited in note 12), citing Institut de Droit International, 47
Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International 275 (1957).

38

Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1962
ICJ 151, 152 (July 20, 1962).

39

Id at 168.
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found that there is a presumption of validity when the Council acts pursuant to
Chapter VII.
In an advisory opinion concerning South Africa’s occupation of Namibia,
the dissenting opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice maintained that the Security Council
cannot abrogate or alter territorial rights, even when it is acting under Chapter
VII. He noted: “This is a principle of international law that is as well-established
as any there can be, and the Security Council is as much subject to it (for the
United Nations is itself a subject of international law) as any of its individual
member States are.” 40 The 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law
reiterated the “paramount importance of the Charter of the United Nations in
the promotion of the rule of law among nations,” 41 and the 1971 Zagreb
resolution of the Institut de Droit International provided that United Nations
forces engaged in peacekeeping were subject to the laws of war. 42
Thus, in the four decades following the creation of the United Nations,
there were occasionally international legal scholars and judicial opinions from
the ICJ that maintained that the Security Council should be subject to the
limitations of general principles of international law or to judicial review.
However, those opinions primarily took place in the context of theoretical
discussions of international law, expressed minority views, or both.
But if there was little attention paid to the issue by scholars and
international judicial bodies, it was also the case that there were few occasions
on which to test this issue. While there had been resistance to mechanisms of
accountability, particularly judicial review, the Security Council itself did not say
explicitly, for example, that it was entitled to engage in genocide or human rights
violations. One scholar noted that “members of the Security Council have never
rejected the claim that international law applies to their conduct.” 43 Indeed,
member states often invoke international law in their argumentation before the
Security Council.44 Security Council resolutions often contain explicit reference
40

Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, 1971 ICJ 16, 300 (June 21, 1970)
(Fitzmaurice dissenting).

41

Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, General Assembly Res No 2625 (XXV), UN Doc
A/RES/2625 (XXV), preamble (1970).
Institut de Droit International, Conditions of Application of Humanitarian Rules of Armed Conflict to
Hostilities in Which United Nations Forces May Be Engaged, Zagreb Sess Res (1971), online at
http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/1971_zag_03_en.pdf (visited Sept 25, 2011).

42

43

44

Mary Ellen O’Connell, The United Nations Security Council and the Authorization of Force: Renewing the
Council Through Law Reform, in Niels Blokker and Nico Schrijver, eds, The Security Council and the Use
of Force: Theory and Reality—A Need for Change? 47, 57 (Martinus Nijhoff 2005).
Steven R. Ratner, The Security Council and International Law, in David M. Malone, ed, The UN Security
Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century 591, 593 (Lynn Rienner 2004).
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to principles of international law, including human rights. For example,
Resolution 666, adopted in September 1990, shortly after sanctions were
imposed on Iraq, requests that the Secretary-General obtain information on the
availability of food in Iraq and Kuwait and instructs him to pay particular
attention to the “categories of persons who might suffer specially, such as
children under 15 years of age, expectant mothers, maternity cases, the sick and
the elderly.” 45 Because the formal language of United Nations resolutions has
not explicitly rejected international law, there have been no documents or public
statements that themselves provided an occasion to confront the question of
whether the Council is bound in its practices and policies to abide by
international law.
Prior to 1990, there also were not any actions or policies on the part of the
Security Council that implicated this question in a serious way. Because of the
broader paralysis of the Security Council during the Cold War, there were few
resolutions passed at all, much less Chapter VII actions. The end of the Cold
War changed that. While there were only twenty Security Council resolutions in
1989, this number increased to thirty-seven in 1990, forty-two in 1991, seventyfour in 1992, and ninety-three in 1993. 46 Chapter VII resolutions went from zero
or one per year to fifteen to twenty per year. 47
Some described this resurgence of Council activity in glowing terms, as
signaling new possibilities for the effectiveness of institutions of global
governance. Referring to the consensus that emerged in response to Iraq’s
invasion of Kuwait, one commentator noted:
To many hopeful observers, this successful combination of American
military capacity and Security Council legal authority represented a longdelayed realization of the founding vision of a world order that married
power and legitimacy. . . . This was beginning to look like the sort of UN
promised at San Francisco. 48

However, the collapse of the Soviet Union also meant that the US could exercise
hegemony within the Council in a way that had never been possible before; the
US was in a position to insert its interests and agenda into what was now an
extraordinarily powerful vehicle of global governance. One scholar expressed
concern that the Security Council might exercise its extraordinary powers in a
manner that was arbitrary and highly politicized:
There is a lack of consistency in practice, a failure to articulate principled
lines of distinction identifying when a UN response is appropriate, and a
45

Security Council Res No 666, UN Doc S/RES/666, ¶¶ 3–4 (1990).

46
47

Manusama, United Nations Security Council at 2 n 9 (cited in note 29).
Edward C. Luck, UN Security Council: Practice and Promise 8 (Rutledge 2006).

48

Id at 52.
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reliance on unrestricted mandates to coalitions of States led by the United
States. The Security Council is perceived as a geopolitical instrument, one
that is currently dominated by the United States . . . . 49

Thus, the concern of overreaching by the permanent members of the
Council was anticipated from the inception of the United Nations and on many
occasions thereafter; however, until the end of the Cold War, this concern was
overridden by the view that the Council should not be constrained when facing
emergency situations.

III. T HE I SSUE OF O VERREACHING
A. Lockerbie, Iraq, and Bosnia
In the early 1990s, there were a number of occasions that directly invited
the question of the abuse of power within the Security Council. These include
the Lockerbie incident; the sanctions on Iraq; and the arms embargo imposed on
Bosnia.

1. The Lockerbie case.
In 1988, terrorists detonated a bomb on an airliner while it was passing
over Lockerbie, Scotland. Two-hundred seventy people were killed. Two of
those sought for prosecution were Libyan nationals. The US and UK demanded
that Libya extradite them, although neither country had an extradition treaty
with Libya. 50 Libya initiated a criminal investigation against the suspects, asking
the US and UK to provide any evidence they had in order to pursue a
prosecution. 51 The US and UK refused to do so, insisting instead that Libya
extradite the suspects. Libya declined.52
The 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Civil Aviation53 provides that in such cases a state must
either extradite suspects for trial or try the suspects itself. 54 Although Libya had
complied with its treaty obligations by initiating criminal prosecution of the
suspects, the Security Council demanded that Libya comply with the extradition
49

50

51
52

Richard A. Falk, The United Nations and the Rule of Law, in Saul H. Mendlovitz and Burns H.
Weston, eds, Preferred Futures for the United Nations 301, 318 (Transnational 1995).
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident
at Lockerbie (Libya v US), Application Instituting Proceedings (AIP), 1998 ICJ 115, § II.i (Mar 3,
1992) (Libya v US AIP).
Id.
Id.

53

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 974 UN
Treaty Ser 178 (1971).

54

Id at Arts 5(2), 5(3), 8.
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demands of the US and UK (as well as France) for the alleged role of the two
men in the bombing.
When Libya refused, the Security Council, invoking Chapter VII,
sanctioned Libya, imposing an embargo on arms, aviation, and imports for
petroleum production. 55 Libya then brought a set of actions against the US and
the UK before the ICJ, in which Libya argued that it was in full compliance with
the Montreal Convention; that Article 7 of the Convention entitled Libya to
prosecute its own nationals, especially in the absence of extradition treaties with
the US or UK; and that the Council had no legitimate grounds to impose
sanctions. 56 The ICJ ruled against Libya on the grounds that, under Article 103
of the Charter, a Security Council resolution overrides other international
agreements, including the Montreal Convention. 57
The case raised concerns within the international community about the
Council’s interpretation of its powers and the extremes to which it would go to
enforce a questionable interpretation. If the Council could invoke Chapter VII
to impose sanctions when Libya was in full compliance with international law,
then it seemed the Council was free to make a determination that any state had
committed a breach or threat to peace, even if it had not violated international
law in any regard.
The case also raised the question of the scope and limits of the Council’s
power. In a separate opinion, Judge Shahabuddeen asked:
[W]hether a decision of the Security Council may override the legal rights of
States, and, if so, whether there are any limitations on the power of the
Council to characterize a situation as one [warranting this consequence]. Are
there any limits to the Council’s powers of appreciation? . . . If there are any
limits, what are those limits, and what body, if other than the Security
Council, is competent to say what those limits are? 58

In his dissent, Judge Weeramantry used stronger language, maintaining that
“[t]he history of the United Nations Charter thus corroborates the view that a
clear limitation on the plenitude of the Security Council’s powers is that those
powers must be exercised in accordance with the well-established principles of
international law.” 59 A number of scholars reacted to the Council’s measures
against Libya and to the ICJ ruling by asking whether the Council is bound by

55

Security Council Res No 748, UN Doc S/RES/748 (1992); Security Council Res No 883, UN
Doc S/RES/883 (1993).

56
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Lockerbie, 1998 ICJ 115, § II.iii.
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident
at Lockerbie (Libya v US), Provisional Measures, 1992 ICJ 114, ¶ 42 (Apr 14, 1992).
Id at ¶ 142 (separate opinion of Shahabuddeenin).
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Id at ¶ 175 (Weeramantry dissenting).
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law, and if so, who would judge which laws were binding and whether the
Council was or was not in compliance. 60
The case illustrated the degree to which the Security Council was
susceptible of being driven by the unilateral interests of its permanent members:
without a counterweight, the US and UK were able to employ the machinery of
global governance to pursue their national interests in prosecuting the Libyan
suspects, regardless of the legality of the measure.

2. The humanitarian impact of the Iraq sanctions.
In August 1990, in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the Security
Council imposed on Iraq the most comprehensive sanctions in the history of
global governance, prohibiting all exports and all imports, except medicine and,
conditionally, food. 61 For eight months, Iraq was not even allowed to import
food. 62 The combined humanitarian impact of the sanctions and the bombing
campaign of the 1991 Persian Gulf War was immediate and severe. With the
sanctions in place, it was not possible for Iraq to rehabilitate its infrastructure
after the bombing, and a humanitarian crisis continued. In particular, the allied
bombing destroyed electric generating plants, water purification systems, and
sewage treatment facilities. The sanctions prevented them from being repaired
or rebuilt. This lack of infrastructure resulted in ongoing epidemics of cholera
and typhoid. In 1990 the incidence of typhoid was 11.3 per 100,000 people; by
1994 it was more than 142 per 100,000.63 In 1989 there were 0 cases of cholera
per 100,000 people; by 1994 there were 1,344 per 100,000.64 In March 1991, an
envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General reported that the situation was

60

61
62

63

64

See, for example, David Schweigman, The Authority of the Security Council Under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter: Legal Limits and the Role of the International Court of Justice 244–60 (Kluwer 2001); Scott I.
Bortz, Avoiding a Collision of Competence: The Relationship between the Security Council and the International
Court of Justice in Light of Libya vs. United States, 2 Fla St U J Transnatl L & Poly 353, 370 (1993);
Thomas M. Franck, Comment, The ‘Powers of Appreciation’: Who Is the Ultimate Guardian of the UN
Legality?, 86 Am J Intl L 519, 522 (1992); Bernd Martenczuk, The Security Council, the International
Court, and Judicial Review: What Lessons from Lockerbie?, 10 Eur J Intl L 517, 518–19 (1999).
Security Council Res No 666, UN Doc S/RES/661, ¶¶ 3–4 (1990).
Id at ¶ 4. This at least was the public language of the document, although in closed meetings the
US and other members of the Council blocked all imports of food into Iraq for several months.
See Joy Gordon, Invisible War: The United States and the Iraq Sanctions 52–54 (Harvard 2010).
World Health Organization, Health Conditions of the Population in Iraq Since the Gulf Crisis,
WHO/EHA 96.1, 1, 12 (1996), online at http://www.who.int/disasters/repo/5249.html (visited
Oct 14, 2011).
Id.
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“near apocalyptic,” 65 describing in detail the broad collapse of Iraq’s
infrastructure, including water purification, sewage treatment, agricultural
production, food supplies and distribution, and the telephone system and all
modern means of communication. Iraq, he reported, “has, for some time to
come, been relegated to a pre-industrial age.”66 With the sanctions in place, the
humanitarian crisis continued for more than a decade.
The widespread and indiscriminate damage done by the Iraq sanctions
brought criticisms of the Council and its use of sanctions from many sources.
Within the United Nations, the humanitarian damage raised fundamental
questions about the nature, and even the legitimacy, of the United Nations itself.
In 1995 United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali described
economic sanctions as a “blunt instrument” that raised ethical questions about
the legitimacy of inflicting suffering on vulnerable groups, complicated the work
of humanitarian agencies by imposing arduous bureaucratic requirements on
them, and conflicted with the development objectives of the United Nations by
doing long-term damage to the productive capacity of the country. 67 In 2000,
United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan maintained that “the
humanitarian situation in Iraq poses a serious moral dilemma for this
Organization.” 68 The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
passed a resolution condemning the Security Council sanctions on Iraq. 69 In a
report commissioned by the Commission on Human Rights, the Belgian jurist
Marc Bossuyt described the situation in Iraq as “extremely grave,”70 and he
suggested that the sanctions were “unequivocally illegal under existing
international humanitarian law and human rights law.” 71 Legal scholars
repeatedly questioned whether the Security Council was exceeding the scope of
its legitimacy in imposing such measures. Many asked whether the Council, in its
Chapter VII interventions, should be subject to the same restraints as nations in
65

UN, Report to the Secretary-General on Humanitarian Needs in Kuwait and Iraq in the Immediate Post-Crisis
Environment by a Mission to the Area Led by Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, Under-Secretary-General for
Administration and Management, UN Doc S/22366, ¶ 8 (1991).
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Id.
UN Secretary-General, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the
Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations: Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the
Organization, UN Doc A/50/60 - S/1995/1, ¶ 70 (1995).

67
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UN SCOR, 55th Sess, 4120th mtg at 2, UN Doc S/PV.4120 (2000).
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Humanitarian Situation of the Iraqi
Population, Sub-Commission on Human Rights Decision 2000/112, UN Doc
E/CN.4/2000/L.11/Add.2 (2000).

70

Marc Bossuyt, UN Commission on Human Rights, The Adverse Consequences of Economic Sanctions on
the Enjoyment of Human Rights, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/33, ¶ 59 (2000).

71

Id at ¶ 71.
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warfare, particularly the principles of discrimination and proportionality;
whether the use of sanctions against Iraq was itself a human rights violation;
whether the sanctions on Iraq undermined the broader credibility of the United
Nations; and whether the effects of the sanctions created instability and harmed
the innocent, contravening the Council’s mandate to ensure peace and security. 72

3. Bosnia.
In response to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the Security Council
invoked Chapter VII and passed Resolution 713, which prohibited the supply of
arms and military equipment to all parties to the conflict. 73 However, this did not
de-escalate the conflict. On the contrary, because of the substantial imbalance in
arms, the result was that the embargo enabled Serbia to implement a policy of
ethnic cleansing, while the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina could not acquire
arms to defend itself. 74 Although this result was not the intention of the Council,
it nevertheless raised concerns about Chapter VII measures that go awry.
Because these measures required the participation of all the member states
within the United Nations, they demonstrated that a strategic misjudgment on
the part of Council could result in a catastrophe of great magnitude. When
Bosnia brought an action against Serbia before the ICJ, Judge Lauterpacht
72

See, for example, Michael Cornell, A Decade of Failure: The Legality and Efficacy of United Nations
Actions in the Elimination of Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction, 16 Conn J Intl L 325, 346–47 (2001)
(“Does UNSCR 687’s Broad Scope Violate the UN Charter? . . . [The issue becomes] whether
such far-reaching provisions are necessary to achieve such peace and security.”); Marcella David,
After-Words: At the End of the Day, 11 Transnatl L & Contemp Probs 427, 428 (2001) (suggesting
that there was neither “moral nor political authority” for the sanctions on Iraq); Andrew K.
Fishman, Between Iraq and a Hard Place: The Use of Economic Sanctions and Threats to International Peace
and Security, 13 Emory Intl L Rev 687, 708–10 (1999) (discussing the application of jus cogens to the
Security Council); Judith G. Gardam, Legal Restraints on Security Council Military Enforcement Action,
17 Mich J Intl L 221, 293 (1996) (noting that concern about the impact of economic sanctions is
not new but takes on new implications when associated with Security Council enforcement);
Peggy Kozal, Note, Is the Continued Use of Sanctions As Implemented Against Iraq a Violation of
International Human Rights?, 28 Den J Intl L & Poly 383, 391–99 (2000) (discussing customary law
and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child as measures of accountability for
the Council); Mary Ellen O’Connell, Debating the Law of Sanctions, 13 Eur J Intl L 63, 63 (2002)
(“The impact of United Nations sanctions on Iraq has sparked a worldwide debate on all aspects
of sanctions, including their legality.”); Rene Provost, Starvation As a Weapon: Legal Implications of the
United Nations Food Blockade Against Iraq and Kuwait, 30 Colum J Transnatl L 577, 618–22 (1992)
(discussing the application of the principles of distinction and proportionality to the food
embargo); Burns Weston, Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision Making: Precarious
Legitimacy, 85 Am J Intl L 516, 523 (1991) (questioning whether Resolution 678, which implicitly
authorized the use of force against Iraq, exceeded the legitimate scope of the Council’s authority,
in response to inordinate pressure from the United States).
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Security Council Res No 713, UN Doc S/RES/713 (1991).
Kimberly Ann Elliott, Analyzing the Effect of Targeted Sanctions, in David Cortright and George A.
Lopez, eds, Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft 171, 174 (Rowman & Littlefield 2002).
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maintained that the Security Council had to be bound by international law, at
least with regard to something as fundamental as the prohibition on genocide:
“One has only to state the . . . proposition thus—that a Security Council
resolution may even require participation in genocide—for its unacceptability to
be apparent.” 75 As with the Lockerbie case and the Iraq sanctions, legal scholars
noted that the Council’s actions regarding Bosnia raised concerns about whether
it is limited in its actions by international law, and if so, who would make and
enforce such a determination. 76

B. Other Concerns of Overreaching
There were other occasions on which the Security Council, invoking
Chapter VII, took unprecedented measures of questionable legitimacy. Some,
such as the establishment of the tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for
Rwanda, ultimately had broad credibility. 77 But even those measures raised
questions. 78 As international law scholars have maintained for decades, Chapter
VII gives such broad powers to the Council because the Charter envisions a
moment of crisis, where it would not be possible to wait for the consensus of
the broader international community before acting; the member states confer
primary responsibility on the Council for the maintenance of international peace
and security “[i]n order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United
Nations.” 79 This mandate to respond quickly in the face of emergencies was the
rationale that was given when the Charter was drafted, and it was echoed
repeatedly in the years that followed. In light of this, creating a judicial tribunal,
which would hear cases that could continue on for years, seems a questionable
use of those powers.

75

Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures
(Bos & Her v Yugo), 1993 ICJ 325, 440 (Sept 13, 1993) (separate opinion of Lauterpacht).
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See Faiza Patel King, Sensible Scrutiny: The Yugoslavia Tribunal’s Development of Limits on the Security
Council’s Powers Under Chapter VII of the Charter, 10 Emory Intl L Rev 509, 514 (1996) (suggesting
that “the Yugoslavia Tribunal’s conclusions regarding the limits on the Security Council’s powers
have advanced international jurisprudence on this issue by several steps”); Craig Scott, et al, A
Memorial for Bosnia: Framework of Legal Arguments Concerning the Lawfulness of the Maintenance of the
United Nations Security Council’s Arms Embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina, 16 Mich J Intl L 1, 6 (1994)
(discussing the concern that the arms embargo contributed to the Bosnian government’s inability
to prevent genocide).
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Louise Arbour and Aryeh Neier, History and Future of the International Criminal Tribunals in the Former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 13 Am U Intl L Rev 1495, 1496 (1998).
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There were also other measures by the Council in the early 1990s that
expanded the use of Chapter VII in unprecedented ways and that raised
questions of overreaching. In response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August
1990, the Council’s imposition of reparations was unprecedented in its history,
as were its determination of the boundary dispute and its imposition of no-fly
zones. 80 While Article 47 of Chapter VII envisions that the Security Council
would establish a body to oversee the use of force, the Iraq measures, as well as
others, authorized the use of force by member states, not by the forces under
United Nations leadership envisioned under Article 43. As the Council more
frequently invited member states to enforce its Chapter VII measures, it ceded
direct supervision, raising questions about the legitimacy of member states
interpreting for themselves the scope of their authority in these cases. 81 The
expanded use of peacekeeping forces and the role of member states in enforcing
Chapter VII measures raised questions about whether such forces were subject
to the laws of war. 82 Criticisms of the humanitarian impact of the sanctions
imposed by the Council were also raised in the context of Haiti. 83 Others
questioned the legitimacy of Chapter VII interventions in internal conflicts; 84
whether United Nations peacekeeping forces are bound by international law;
and the proliferation of measures involving economic sanctions. 85
Thus, the concern about the Council’s overreaching and the very real
possibility that the Council might abuse its considerable power—or had already
done so—led many to revisit the question: What exactly are the legal limits on
the Council, particularly in the context of Chapter VII measures? In contrast to
the 1950s, the mid-1990s marked a dramatic shift in how this question was
asked—insistently and with considerable anxiety—and by whom. It was no
longer an abstract issue discussed at academic conferences that arose
occasionally and fleetingly. Beginning in the mid-1990s, the question became an
explicit and serious challenge to the preeminent institutions of global
governance and a topic that was addressed repeatedly and in many variations
within the international community and scholarly literature.

80

Schweigman, Authority of the Security Council Under Chapter VII at 1 (cited in note 60).
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Gardam, 17 Mich J Intl L at 294 (cited in note 72).
See generally Richard D. Glick, Lip Service to the Laws of War: Humanitarian Law and United Nations
Armed Forces, 17 Mich J Intl L 53 (1995); Robert O. Weiner and Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Beyond the
Laws of War: Peacekeeping in Search of a Legal Framework, 27 Colum Hum Rts L Rev 293 (1996).
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O’Connell, Authorization of Force at 69 (cited in note 43).
Ruth Gordon, United Nations Intervention in Internal Conflicts: Iraq, Somalia, and Beyond, 15 Mich J Intl
L 519, 528 (1994).
Schrijver noted that as of January 1, 1994, there were eight cases of sanctions imposed by the
Security Council. Use of Economic Sanctions at 123 (cited in note 23).
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IV. R ESPONSES TO THE C OUNCIL ’ S A CTIVIS M
The international legal and diplomatic community reacted in several ways.
First, there was explicit discussion of a question that had not been viewed as a
live issue in many decades. The concern articulated was not just that the Council
might exceed the scope of its mandate or that the machinery of the Council
might be subject to extraordinary control by one of the permanent members,
but that the Council itself might violate fundamental standards of human rights
and international humanitarian law. If the Council were, in principle, limited by
international law, what court could judge it, and what entity would enforce those
limits? Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali asked: “[W]ith the permanent members
now largely unanimous, does the Security Council have unlimited powers? How
far can it extend the scope of its activities? Is it up to the Council alone to
interpret what its own powers are? Are its actions essentially unchecked?”86 José
Alvarez noted that “[s]ome realists characterize the Charter scheme as
constituting a ‘police state’ rather than a system based on the ‘rule of law.’” 87
Michael Reisman and Douglas Stevick proposed that the Council be subject to
the same limitations as states during warfare, such as the principles of
proportionality and discrimination. 88 Schweigman argued that the Security
Council could not commit a manifest abuse of rights, which “would occur when
[its] action was manifestly disproportionate or unnecessary as regards its aim, the
restoration of international peace.” 89

86

87
88

89

Bardo Fassbender, UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto: A Constitutional Perspective 13
(Kluwer 1998). See also Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Statement Delivered to the Congress on Public
International Law Held at the United Nations (Mar 17, 1995), in International Law as a Language for
Foreign Relations 593, 596 (Kluwer 1996).
José E. Alvarez, Judging the Security Council, 90 Am J Intl L 1, 2 (1996).
W. Michael Reisman and Douglas L. Stevick, The Applicability of International Law Standards to United
Nations Economic Sanctions Programmes, 9 Eur J Intl L 86, 96 (1998). See also Joy K. Fausey,
Comment, Does the United Nations’ Use of Collective Sanctions to Protect Human Rights Violate Its Own
Human Rights Standards?, 10 Conn J Intl L 193, 209–213 (1994) (discussing whether economic
sanctions violate the principle of proportionality); T.D. Gill, Legal and Some Political Limitations on
the Power of the UN Security Council to Exercise Its Enforcement Powers Under Chapter VII of the Charter,
26 Netherlands YB Intl L 33, 68 (1995) (discussing “the question as to which legal limitations—if
any—apply to the Council in the execution of its responsibilities as the collective security organ of
the United Nations”); Gardam, 17 Mich J Intl L at 307–309 (cited in note 72).
Schweigman, Authority of the Security Council Under Chapter VII at 177 (cited in note 60). Thomas
Franck and José Alvarez propose similar standards of “gross abuse of discretion” and “test of
manifest irregularity.” Id at 177 n 784, citing Thomas M. Franck, The United Nations as Guarantor of
International Peace and Security: Past, Present and Future, in Christian Tomuschat, ed, The United Nations
at Fifty: A Legal Perspective 25, 37 (Kluwer 1995), and citing Alvarez, 90 Am J Intl L at 26 (cited in
note 87).
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Within the international community, there was also a multifaceted initiative
toward Security Council reform. Except for the expansion of the elected
members in 1965 from six seats to ten seats, 90 there had been little interest in any
institutional changes in the Council for decades. The sense that the Security
Council had abused the enormous power at its disposal, and the fear that it
could do so again, triggered a series of initiatives toward Security Council
reform, specifically challenging the adequacy of the representation on the
Council and the special powers of the permanent members. In June 1992,
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, in his Agenda for Peace, envisioned a number of
ways that the Council could be more effective. 91 Later that year, there was a
summit meeting of the nonaligned movement, at which there was broad
international support for proposals to reform the structure of membership
within the Council. At the General Assembly session in November 1992, there
were further calls for Security Council reform, and in December, the General
Assembly adopted a resolution to consider the question of equitable
representation, and an increase in membership, of the Council. 92 The following
year, the General Assembly created an “Open-Ended Working Group to
consider all aspects of the question of an increase in membership . . . and other
matters related to the Security Council.”93 In 1995, the General Assembly
adopted a resolution that “[t]he Security Council should . . . be expanded and its
working methods continue to be reviewed to enhance its representative
character and improve its . . . transparency.” 94
Within the Working Group and the General Assembly, the permanent
members consistently objected to the proposed changes. Still, the calls for
reform, from many sources, continued. The United Nations Millennium
Declaration of 2000 stated that member states would intensify their efforts “to
achieve a comprehensive reform of the Security Council in all its aspects.”95 In
2003, Secretary-General Annan initiated an effort to revisit the idea of Security
Council reform, appointing a High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change to consider new approaches to threats to peace and security, including

90

UN Charter Art 23.
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UN Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping, UN
Doc A/47/277 - S/24111 (1992).

92

General Assembly Res No 47/62, UN Doc A/RES/47/62 (1992).
General Assembly Res No 48/26, UN Doc A/RES/48/26 (1993).
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Security Council reform. In 2005, he proposed changes in representation to
provide a place for underrepresented regions. 96
The legitimacy of the institutional structure of the Council came under fire
in legal scholarship as well. In 1993, for example, David Caron commented on
the impunity of the permanent members, noting that the veto means “that
certain members of the [international] community potentially are not
governed.” 97 Erskine Childers argued that “[n]o longer is it morally possible for
democratic peoples to accept that 5 out of 165 member governments can have
such deadly power in the name of a peace-dedicated world organization.” 98 In
1994, Sean Murphy, while defending the legitimacy of the Council, conceded
that “the perception that Security Council decisions lack legitimacy resonates
because it is not clear why some states should count more than others.” 99 Where
the efforts at Security Council reform addressed in abstract terms the issues of
representation and voting, some scholars explicitly raised the issue of the
influence of the US within the Council, calling it a “Faustian bargain,” or
examined the problematic impact of US unilateralism on the Council and the
United Nations in general. 100
A second response to Security Council activism, found in both legal
scholarship and judicial rulings, entailed revisiting the question of whether there
could be judicial review that would provide some degree of oversight over the
Council. José Alvarez asked:
Should the International Court of Justice (ICJ) “judicially review” Security
Council decisions? The question, once fanciful, is now being asked seriously
by litigants in and judges on the World Court, nonpermanent members of
the Security Council that consider it an “undemocratic” body acting as “a

96

UN Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for All, UN
Doc A/59/2005 (2005).

97

David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 87 Am J Intl L 552,
565 (1993).
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Erskine Childers, Gulf Crisis Lessons for the United Nations, 23 Bull of Peace Props 129, 133 (1992).
Sean D. Murphy, The Security Council, Legitimacy, and the Concept of Collective Security After the Cold War,
32 Colum J Transnatl L 201, 252 (1994).
See, for example, Kishore Mahbubani, The Permanent and Elected Council Members, in David M.
Malone, ed, The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century 253, 257 (Lynne Rienner
2004); David M. Malone, A Decade of US Unilateralism?, in David M. Malone and Yuen Foong
Khong, eds, Unilateralism and US Foreign Policy: International Perspectives 19, 20 (Lynne Rienner 2003);
Frederick Rawski and Nathan Miller, The United States in the Security Council: A Faustian Bargain?, in
David M. Malone, ed, The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century 357, 357 (“The
Council has been forced to cater to U.S. interests, thereby undercutting its achievements and
undermining its legitimacy in an effort to remain relevant.”).
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cloak for a new form of imperialism,” and scholars worried about its recent
“quasi-legislative” or “quasi-judicial” acts. 101

Writing in 1994, Mohammed Bedjaoui observed that in 1952, when the
Institut de Droit International considered whether there should be judicial
remedy for improper decisions by international political organs, the concern was
dismissed as premature. But, Bedjaoui notes:
Now that half a century has elapsed, it is no longer “premature” to raise the
problem of controlling legality once again. Far from exonerating the United
Nations from all surveillance, the weight of the responsibilities entrusted to
it, which is now even greater than in 1952, cries out for the installation of
checks and balances, including a reasonable and balanced mechanism for
checking the legality of its acts.102

A. Judicial and Scholarly Responses
It was in this context that scholars and jurists revisited the question of
whether the Security Council is bound by international human rights law when
exercising its mandate under Chapter VII, or whether the Chapter VII powers
override principles of human rights. 103

1. The 1990s: revisiting the question.
The first generation of responses, primarily in the early and mid-1990s,
were diametrically opposed to the position of Kelsen and Dulles: of course the
Council is bound by international law—it is unthinkable that the Council could
legally commit an atrocity in the name of restoring peace. These responses were
widespread and emphatic, and they incorporated several different arguments.
The central argument relied on Article 24. Judge Weeramantry in his
dissent in Lockerbie noted that Article 24(1) provides that the Council “‘shall act
in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.’ The duty
is imperative and the limits are categorically stated.” 104 Judge Lauterpacht in the
Bosnian Genocide case reasoned: “Nor should one overlook the significance of the
provision in Article 24(2) of the Charter that, in discharging its duties to
maintain international peace and security, the Security Council shall act in accord
101

Alvarez, 90 Am J Intl L at 1 (cited in note 87). See also Akande, 46 Intl & Comp L Q at 310–11
(cited in note 11) (discussing whether judicial review is a viable means of achieving accountability
for the Council); Karl Doehring, Unlawful Resolutions of the Security Council and their Legal Consequences,
1 Max Planck YB UN L 91, 93 (1997); Gill, 26 Neth YB Intl L at 113 (cited in note 88); Geoffrey
R. Watson, Constitutionalism, Judicial Review, and the World Court, 34 Harv Intl L J 1, 3 (1993).
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See, for example, Gardam, 17 Mich J Intl L at 312 (cited in note 72); Anna M. Vradenburgh,
Comment, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Charter: Do They ‘Trump’ Human Rights Law?,
14 Loyola LA Intl & Comp L J 175, 189–92 (1991).
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with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.” 105 Many others echoed
this view, invoking an array of arguments. 106 The Bossuyt Report, commissioned
by the UN Commission on Human Rights to examine the Security Council’s use
of economic sanctions, maintained that because Article 24 requires the Council
to act in accordance with the principles and purposes contained in Article 1, it
follows that “no act of the Security Council is exempt from scrutiny as to
whether or not that act is in conformity with the Purposes and Principles of the
United Nations.” 107
In addition to the limitations implied by the Charter, the Bossuyt Report
maintained that the Security Council’s right to economic sanctions cannot “in
any way violate principles of international law stemming from sources ‘outside’
the Charter.” 108 Judith Gardam argued that “there appears to be no justification
for the view that the Security Council is at liberty to completely disregard the
purposes and principles of the Charter, and even less for the denial that it
operates to a certain extent within the general system of international law.” 109
Some looked to the intent of those who drafted the Charter, as did Judge
Weeramantry in his dissent in Lockerbie. 110 Others, such as Doehring, argued that
the United Nations and the Security Council were subjects of international law,
even if they were not states, since every subject of international law is bound by
international law; therefore, they may violate international law. 111 Some argued
that since the Security Council was an entity comprised of states, it could not
have a mandate that conflicted with the legal limits upon states:
If it is the case that the Security Council cannot require States to breach
fundamental humanitarian values in the sanction regimes it imposes on
States, it is surely anomalous to regard it as able to do so itself. It is
inconceivable that with the current emphasis on human rights and
humanitarian principles, the Security Council can be regarded as operating

105
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example, Suy says that “[t]he Council is bound by the Purposes and Principles of the
Organization and discharges its duties on the basis of the specific powers granted by the Charter”;
Gowlland-Debbas holds that “[t]he substantive limits are to be found in Article 24(2), according
to which the Council is bound to act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the
United Nations”; and Fassbender maintains that “[t]he values and goals set out by the Charter in
its preamble and first two articles are . . . standards of legality (or constitutionality) for legal acts
passed by UN organs.” Id.

107

Bossuyt, The Adverse Consequences of Economic Sanctions at ¶ 23 (cited in note 70).
Id at ¶ 24.

108

110

Gardam, 17 Mich J Intl L at 303 (cited in note 72).
See text accompanying note 59.

111

Doehring, 1 Max Planck YB UN L at 92 (cited in note 101).

109

Winter 2012

627

Chicago Journal of International Law

outside the constraints on the conduct of armed conflict that have been
painstakingly developed over the years by States.112

Judge Lauterpacht in the Bosnia case considered the possibility that
Resolution 713, imposing an arms embargo on all the belligerents, “can be seen
as having in effect called on Members of the United Nations, albeit unknowingly
and assuredly unwillingly, to become in some degree supporters of the genocidal
activity . . . and in this manner and to that extent to act contrary to a rule of jus
cogens.” 113 He maintained that it follows that when this resolution “began to make
members of the United Nations accessories to genocide, it ceased to be valid
and binding . . . and that members of the United Nations then became free to
disregard it.” 114
Where Kelsen maintained a distinction between international law and
restoration of peace, Bedjaoui reasoned that these cannot be separated. He
rejected Kelsen’s argument that the Security Council need not take account of
principles of justice and international law. He argued that “Hans Kelsen’s
analysis is not acceptable,” asserting that “all the principal organs of the United
Nations must respect not only the Charter but international law itself.” 115 Some
commentators simply appealed to moral intuition and seemed to be struggling
for adequate language to capture the absurdity and wrongfulness of the
possibility that an institution established for governance and peaceful order
could itself profoundly undermine those purposes—“this machinery cannot be
meant to perform unlawfulness.” 116 In the end they reasoned that the notion of
exempting the Council from international humanitarian law was inconceivable,
unacceptable, and untenable; that the truth of this is so obvious it is incapable of
demonstration; or that “it is undisputed,” even though the matter was clearly
very much in dispute. 117
112
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[h]umanitarian law . . . forms part of the core values and principles of the
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security, the Member States could not, in transferring or conferring the power
to wage war and conduct military operations as an instrument of international
policy, invest the Organization with the power to maintain and restore
international peace and security by means which would violate these
fundamental precepts. The Member States could not attribute to the
Organization a power which they themselves did not and do not possess.
Gill, 26 Neth YB Intl L at 82 (cited in note 88).

113

Bosnian Genocide, 1993 ICJ at 441 (separate opinion of Lauterpacht). See also Akande, 46 Intl &
Comp L Q at 322 (cited in note 11).

114

Bosnian Genocide, 1993 ICJ at 441 (separate opinion of Lauterpacht).
Bedjaoui, New World Order at 32 (cited in note 12).

115
116
117

Doehring, 1 Max Planck YB UN L at 100 (cited in note 101).
See, for example, Bosnian Genocide, 1993 ICJ at 441 (separate opinion of Lauterpacht) (“One has
only to state the proposition thus—that a Security Council resolution may even require
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However, there was a second generation of responses to the question of
whether the Council must itself abide by international human rights law. They
echoed the position held by Kelsen and Dulles, suggesting that the Council can
legally override any such principles, but with a radically different tone. Where
Kelsen and Dulles saw this as simply a matter of the Council’s entitlement and
blithely dismissed objections, those jurists and scholars who were now
suggesting that there may in fact be no limits on the Council conveyed a sense of
anguish. In articles with titles like Playing the Devil’s Advocate: The Security Council is
Unbound by Law, 118 there is a common theme: it may in fact be that the Charter
and international law are inadequate to control the Council under Chapter VII—
and God help us if this is so.
Many of the arguments revisit exactly the concerns addressed in 1948 by
critics of the Charter, who had maintained that the Charter’s language permitted
precisely this interpretation. Of particular concern, as some noted, is Article 103,
which holds that obligations under the Charter override any treaty obligations,
that arguably might include the Convention against Genocide, the Geneva
Conventions, the Convention against Torture, and the International Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights. The supremacy clause “threatens to render the
Council’s subjection to international law partially void.” 119 Some suggested that
Article 103 would vitiate customary law as well. Since it provides that Charter
obligations override member states’ “obligations under any other international
agreement,” it follows that “[i]n a literal sense, Article 103 would render
inoperable not only treaties, but also state obligations under customary

participation in genocide—for its unacceptability to be apparent.”); Bedjaoui, New World Order at 7
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international law, as such obligations are theoretically based on some sort of
agreement.” 120
Some argued that Article 25 imposes obligations on states to implement
Council resolutions, without recognizing any circumstances in which they can
question or decline to follow the Council’s decision, because Article 25 provides
that United Nations members “agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the
Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.” 121 Gabriël Oosthuizen
submits that this arguably implies that the Council must act in accord with the
Charter but not necessarily with international law.122
Several commentators have suggested that the deliberate intent of the
drafters was to exempt the Council from any limits or control. Bedjaoui says:
[I]t is not unreasonable to ask [whether the drafters meant to exempt the
Security Council from any limits] when, on the one hand, the founders of
the Charter deliberately refrained from including any specific legality-test
clause and, on the other hand, the absence of such a clause not only fails to
offer protection against any action in excess of Charter powers but is even
conducive to it. This has been clearly demonstrated in practice. 123

August Reinisch observes that “[t]he most prominent theory, which ‘liberates’
the Security Council from any legal constraints, is based on the argument that
the Council, as the main ‘executive’ organ of the United Nations, was
deliberately exempted from legal limits when fulfilling its major task of securing
world peace and security.”124
Anna Vradenburgh argues that the drafters’ intent was evident in the
language of the Charter, which “appears to vest unlimited power in the
Council.” 125 This is true of Articles 41 and 42. Article 41 provides that the
Council can impose measures not involving the use of force and that these may
include economic, diplomatic, or other measures, without stating any exclusions
or conditions. Article 42, concerning measures involving the use of force,
likewise provides that “[s]uch action may include” operations by air, sea, or land
forces. Neither Article 41 nor 42 provides for any exclusions or conditions.
Others pointed out the disparity contained in Article 1(1). The clause “in
conformity with principles of justice and international law” refers only to
120
121
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123
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settlements of disputes “by peaceful means.” 126 No such provision is found in
the clause pertaining to the use of force, which authorizes the United Nations
“to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats
to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of
the peace.” 127 There was also another argument made in regard to Article 1(1):
that the reference to purposes and principles does not serve as a substantive
limitation on the Council’s powers. Gardam suggested there could be an
interpretation holding that the purposes and principles are “merely words of
exhortation.” She notes that if this were the case, it would allow “for dangerous
leeways of choice to an unrepresentative body necessarily swayed by
considerations that may be antithetical to the ideals of the Charter.” 128 In
addition, Gardam suggests, in light of the fairly vague language of the principles
and purposes, “it is possible to infer from Article 1(1) that if the Charter had
intended otherwise to restrict the Security Council in any way,” it would have
done so explicitly.129
Oosthuizen suggested that an argument might be made that Article 2(7),
which concerns the principle of non-intervention in domestic matters, could also
be read as supporting the interpretation that the Security Council is not limited
by international law because it provides that “[n]othing contained in the present
Charter shall authorize the UN to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state . . . but this principle shall not prejudice
the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.” 130 Bedjaoui suggested that
the Council could be understood to function as a legislative body, and if so, then
there was no provision for overturning or questioning it in this mode:
[T]he idea that the Security Council creates and imposes its own law raises
[the question of] whether the Security Council, when operating in
“lawmaker mode”, is exempted from the requirement to respect, on the one
hand, the provisions of the United Nations Charter and, on the other, the
rules and principles of international law. 131

Dapo Akande and others noted that, in any event, in the absence of judicial
review, no venue has jurisdiction to make a determination as to the legality of a
direct and enforceable Security Council measure. 132 The ICJ, at best, could
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“engage in an ‘expressive’ mode of review by casting doubt on the acceptability
or legality of Council action, thus ‘cueing’ the Council to exercise care in the
future, though not actually voiding the Council decision.” 133 Implicitly referring
to the Security Council “activism” from the early 1990s, Oosthuizen concludes:
Ultimately, then, there are no international legal limits to the [Security
Council (SC)]’s Chapter VII enforcement powers. For example, it is
conceivable that the SC might not honour a people’s right to selfdetermination since it could constitute a threat to or a breach of the peace.
It is conceivable that the SC might ignore the violation, by its own or
mandated forces who are attempting to reimpose international peace and
security in a strategically vital part of the globe, of the fundamental human
rights of those responsible for its serious destabilisation. It is conceivable
that the SC might turn a blind eye to the actual non-compliance with the
Geneva Conventions in a long drawn-out struggle against a pernicious
aggressor. It is conceivable that the SC might underwrite an illegal
secessionist claim because it will ensure regional peace. It is conceivable that
the SC might block weapons supply to a people fighting against genocide. It
is conceivable that the SC might impose sanctions that violate international
human rights and humanitarian law. . . . The [United Nations Charter]’s
drafters clearly intended the SC to be left with absolute powers of
appreciation in maintaining international peace and security. The SC’s
powers are nowhere curtailed by an implicit or explicit reference to
international law. 134

2. The late 1990s through the present.
By the late 1990s, many things had changed. The political balance of the
Council shifted, and there was far more resistance to the will of the US. This was
perhaps most apparent in 2003, when the Council refused to authorize the
invasion of Iraq, despite considerable pressure on the part of the US. The
Council continued to employ Chapter VII measures actively, but there was no
longer the possibility of consensus for the sort of broad or extreme measures
that were seen in the early 1990s. Instead, as with the sanctions imposed on Iran
in 2009 and 2010, the resolutions often resulted from compromises, imposing
measures that were not as harsh or as broad as the US sought.
In addition to the resistance within the Council, the Secretary-General and
General Assembly were increasingly vocal in identifying the points of conflict
between the Council’s Chapter VII measures and international law, and they
called for greater accountability. In 1998, the Secretary-General, in his annual
report to the General Assembly, stated that “[t]he international community
should be under no illusion: these humanitarian and human rights policy goals
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cannot easily be reconciled with those of a sanctions regime.” 135 The following
year, the Secretary-General stated that “[t]he fundamental principles and rules of
international humanitarian law,” including the treatment of noncombatants, the
prohibition on the use of chemical and biological weapons, the prohibition of
anti-personnel mines, the destruction of places of worship and cultural
institutions, and so forth, would be applicable to United Nations forces “in
enforcement actions, or in peacekeeping operations when the use of force is
permitted in self-defence.” 136 In 2005, the report of the Secretary-General’s High
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change called on the Council “to
improve transparency and accountability.” 137 The report also held that the
Security Council “should always address” several basic “criteria of legitimacy”
drawn from international humanitarian law: seriousness of threat, proper
purpose, last resort, proportional means, and balance of consequences. 138

B. The Question of Judicial Review
In addition, there was growing judicial recognition of limitations on the
Security Council, in multiple venues. While there is no procedure to appeal a
resolution passed by the Council directly to a judicial body with the machinery to
enforce a decision against the Council, the ICJ may speak to the validity of a
Security Council resolution in certain circumstances. It can do so in an advisory
opinion sought by the General Assembly, UN agencies within the scope of their
work, or the Council itself. 139 It can also comment upon the validity of
resolutions in contentious cases between states where a Security Council
resolution is pertinent, as was the situation with the Lockerbie case. 140 Writing in
the late 1990s, Akande commented that “[t]he Court may not have the ultimate
authority to interpret the Charter but it certainly has authority to do so.” 141 Even
without machinery to enforce its finding, Akande maintained that an ICJ
decision “to the effect that a certain Security Council resolution is invalid or
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beyond its powers would undermine the legitimacy of that decision and weaken
its claim to compliance.” 142
In 2001, John Dugard suggested that “the total rejection of judicial review
. . . is unlikely to prevail” and that there were several arguments for some form
of judicial review that had growing momentum: the Charter does not explicitly
exclude the competence of the ICJ, as it does with the General Assembly in
Article 12; the preparatory documents were ambiguous on the point; and there
were the limits contained in Articles 1 and 24, requiring the Council to abide by
the principles and purposes of the United Nations. 143
Within judicial venues themselves, there has been a growing recognition
that the Council is bound by international law, as well as a willingness to make a
finding of whether or not the Council has acted in conformity with international
law. In the early 1990s, in the Lockerbie and Bosnian Genocide cases, individual
judges raised these concerns in dissents or in separate opinions. But in 1995, in
the Tadiü case before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, it was the court that stated in a ruling on jurisdiction:
The Security Council is . . . subjected to certain constitutional limitations,
however broad its powers under the constitution may be. Those powers
cannot, in any case, go beyond the limits of the jurisdiction of the
Organization at large, not to mention other specific limitations or those
which may derive from the internal division of power within the
Organization. In any case, neither the text nor the spirit of the Charter
conceives of the Security Council as legibus solutus (unbound by law). 144

But by far the most significant development in this regard is a line of cases
concerning the due process rights of those whose assets were frozen pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 1267 and the successor resolutions. These
resolutions designate persons, companies, and foundations whose assets are to
be frozen on the basis of putative ties to al Qaida, the Taliban, or Osama bin
Laden. While some procedural protections have been added in response to
litigation and political pressure, these lists have been deeply problematic: initially
names were added by the Security Council committee overseeing the sanctions
(the “1267 Committee”) without any evidence, or even any specific information,
about the alleged ties of these individuals to al Qaida or the Taliban. For many
years there was no opportunity for the individuals affected to see the accusations
against them, even in summary form, much less to challenge their accuracy.
Even after multiple reforms, there is still no impartial body to which affected
142
143

144
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individuals can appeal, and in some cases individuals remain on the list for years
on end, designated globally as supporters of terrorism despite being vindicated
by extensive investigations.
These due process issues have been raised before numerous domestic and
international courts. In 2009, a Canadian judge commented that the 1267 regime
was “not unlike that of Josef K. in Kafka’s The Trial, who awakens one morning,
and for reasons never revealed to him or the reader, is arrested and prosecuted
for an unspecified crime.” 145 In the case of Sayadi v Belgium, 146 the Brussels Court
of First Instance ruled in favor of a Belgian couple whose assets were frozen on
dubious grounds and ordered the Belgian government to submit a delisting
request to the 1267 Committee. The government did so, but the request was
denied. 147 However, when the couple appealed to the Human Rights Committee
(HRC), the Belgian government argued that it could not be subject to the HRC’s
jurisdiction because Belgium had no choice in implementing the Security
Council measure—Article 25 obliges it to implement Chapter VII measures
without allowing for exception or challenges, and Article 103 holds that, in the
event of a conflict, a Chapter VII measure overrides a state’s other treaty
obligations. The HRC found that it did not have jurisdiction to rule directly on
the legality of a Security Council measure but that it could find that a state was in
violation of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
even if the state was acting pursuant to the Security Council’s measures. 148
The Kadi case, concerning the European Community’s implementation of
the 1267 regime, has contributed significantly to this jurisprudence. Yassin
Abdullah Kadi, a Saudi businessman, was added to the list of those associated
with al Qaida shortly after the bombing of the World Trade Center in September
2001, and his assets were frozen in October 2001. According to the summary of
reasons justifying these measures, Kadi was a shareholder in a bank in which
“planning sessions for an attack against a United States facility . . . may have
taken place.” 149 There was no information as to the nature of the attack, the date,
whether the meeting in fact took place, whether al Qaida was involved, and in
what manner Kadi was allegedly involved.150 The summary of reasons also states
145
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that Kadi “owned several firms in Albania which funneled money to extremists,”
although it does not identify the firms, the extremists, or Kadi’s ostensible role.
The court noted that there was an extensive criminal investigation against Kadi
in Albania, which turned up no evidence against him. 151 Likewise, in the face of
extensive criminal investigations in Turkey and Switzerland, where Kadi had the
opportunity to refute the claims against him, he was exonerated. 152
The European Community’s Court of First Instance (CFI) ruled in 2005
that because the EU was acting pursuant to a Chapter VII measure, the EU had
no discretion in implementing the will of the Security Council. 153 Consequently,
the court reasoned, reviewing the legality of the EU’s implementation would
indirectly constitute judicial review of the Security Council. The court found that
it did not have this jurisdiction. The court commented that indirect judicial
review of a Security Council resolution was possible where there were alleged
violations of jus cogens, which is binding on all subjects of international law,
including the United Nations. However, the CFI found that no rights within the
parameters of jus cogens had been violated. 154
Kadi appealed to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which overruled the
CFI, finding that EU regulations, even those implementing a Security Council
measure, must conform with European Community law, including human rights
law developed and recognized by the EU. The ECJ found that the EU
regulations violated fundamental rights, including the right to property, as well as
the right to a hearing and to effective judicial review. 155 The most recent ruling,
issued by the General Court of the EU156 in September 2010, found that the
EU’s practices still did not provide an adequate review of Kadi’s claims, and the
court again annulled the EU regulations implementing Resolution 1267. 157 The
Kadi case suggests that the courts are showing increasing willingness not only to
comment upon the legality of Chapter VII measures, but also to issue rulings
that effectively block implementation of the Security Council measures.
In addition, two recent decisions of the Grand Chamber of the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) open an extraordinary possibility for judicial
review. In Al-Skeini v United Kingdom, 158 a case was brought under the
151
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Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms by
the families of six Iraqis who had been killed by UK soldiers, during the period
in 2003 and 2004 when Iraq was occupied by the Coalition Provisional
Authority, whose authority was recognized by the Security Council in Resolution
1483 (2003). Rejecting the findings of the UK courts, the Grand Chamber
awarded substantial damages to the plaintiffs. It reasoned that, in light of the
occupation of Basrah, the UK held “some of the public powers normally to be
exercised by a sovereign government,” and consequently, it had “exercised
authority and control over individuals killed in the course of such security
operations,” giving the ECHR jurisdiction. 159
In Al-Jedda v United Kingdom, 160 the applicant was an Iraqi who came to the
UK in 1992, where he was granted asylum and citizenship. In 2004, he returned
to Iraq, where he was arrested by US soldiers and held in a UK detention center
on suspicion that he had conspired with Islamic terrorists to attack the coalition
forces. 161 The plaintiff argued that his detention violated Article 5(1) of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(Convention), which provides that a person may be detained only in certain
circumstances, such as lawful arrest. 162 The UK government maintained that
while Al-Jedda’s detention did not fall under one of the enumerated categories,
the Convention did not apply because Al-Jedda’s detention had been authorized
by Security Council Resolution 1546. 163 Consequently, they argued that since
Resolution 1546 had been adopted pursuant to Chapter VII, Article 103 implied
that Resolution 1546 overrode the Convention.164 The House of Lords agreed
unanimously, finding that “Article 103 of the United Nations Charter gave
primacy to resolutions of the Security Council, even in relation to human rights
agreements.” 165 However, the Grand Chamber of the ECHR rejected this
argument in strong terms:
[T]he Court must have regard to the purposes for which the United Nations
was created. As well as the purpose of maintaining international peace and
security, set out in the first subparagraph of Article 1 of the United Nations
Charter, the third subparagraph provides that the United Nations was
established to “achieve international cooperation in . . . promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.” Article
159
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24(2) of the Charter requires the Security Council, in discharging its duties
with respect to its primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security, to “act in accordance with the Purposes
and Principles of the United Nations.” Against this background, the Court
considers that, in interpreting its resolutions, there must be a presumption
that the Security Council does not intend to impose any obligation on
Member States to breach fundamental principles of human rights. In the
event of any ambiguity in the terms of a Security Council Resolution, the
Court must therefore choose the interpretation which is most in harmony
with the requirements of the Convention and which avoids any conflict of
obligations. In the light of the United Nations’ important role in promoting
and encouraging respect for human rights, it is to be expected that clear and
explicit language would be used were the Security Council to intend States
to take particular measures which would conflict with their obligations
under international human rights law. 166

Thus, the ECHR rulings suggest that regional courts may find that a state is
in violation of international human rights law while acting under color of a
Chapter VII measure, and it may then be subject to at least civil penalties.

C. The Scholarly Literature: An Emerging Consensus
As domestic and international courts have increasingly come to recognize
legal limits on the Security Council, the scholarly literature has, for the most part,
developed a consensus. There is now rarely anyone who suggests that the
Council can override international humanitarian law altogether. On the contrary,
there is general agreement that the Council is limited on a variety of grounds.
Some maintain, in broad terms, that “[t]he Security Council is obliged to respect
the rules of international law, i.e. the limits of its own competencies under the
Charter of the United Nations and the rules of general international law as
well” 167 and that the Council’s mandate must be circumscribed by the broader
commitment to international humanitarian law. 168 In 2002, Mary Ellen
O’Connell wrote that “a clear consensus is emerging among international
lawyers that while the Security Council may have broad authority to impose
sanctions, it must observe standards in how sanctions are imposed, even if that
means that sanctions are less effective,” 169 and that has continued to be the case.
In 2007, Schott described a “growing unease with the UN’s ability to limit a
Security Council increasingly wont to exercise its impressive discretion by
reference to security concerns.” 170
166
167

Id at ¶ 102.
Doehring, 1 Max Planck YB UN L at 108 (cited in note 101).

169

Gardam, 17 Mich J Intl L at 321 (cited in note 72).
O’Connell, Authorization of Force at 64 (cited in note 43).

170

Schott, 6 Nw J Intl Hum Rts L at 24 (cited in note 78).

168

638

Vol. 12 No. 2

The Sword of Damocles

Gordon

For the last decade, scholars have, with consistency, dismissed the
argument that Article 1(1) implies that international law only applies to peaceful
settlements and not to Chapter VII measures. O’Connell, for example, maintains
that this position “appear[s] to contradict the plain terms of Article 24(2) that ‘in
discharging [its] duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.’”171 It is a common viewpoint
that the principles and purposes articulated in Article 1 require that the Council
“cannot maintain peace and security at the complete expense” of the right of
self-determination, the promotion of human rights, the obligation to solve social
and economic problems, the obligation to act in good faith, and so on. 172
There is not complete consensus about exactly what the limits on the
Security Council are, but in judicial rulings and among scholars, there is
considerable agreement. Many maintain that the Security Council is bound by
the non-derogable rights—those rights that must be respected by states even in
times of emergency or armed conflict—that are contained in the central
documents of human rights, such as the ICCPR, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and the Genocide Convention. Erika De Wet maintains that “the nonderogable rights include the right to life, the prohibition of torture or cruel and
degrading treatment, the prohibition of slavery . . . and freedom of thought,
religion and conscience.” 173 Likewise, T.D. Gill maintains that “in any event the
Council will at a minimum be bound by the rules of human rights contained in the
International Bill of Rights from which no derogation is permitted in time of
emergency or armed conflict.” 174 In addition to the Kadi court, others have
maintained that the Security Council may not violate due process and the right
to a fair trial 175 or the non-derogable rights under the ICCPR. 176 Some argue that
the protections contained in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
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should apply to any measures by the Council. 177 Others frame the position more
broadly, reasoning that the Council is obliged to abide by the principles of
discrimination, proportionality, and military necessity. 178
Numerous scholars maintain that jus cogens, the peremptory norms of
international law, constitute an “inherent limit on any organization’s powers.” 179
Akande maintains that the Security Council is bound by jus cogens and generally
recognized norms of human rights. 180 Kenneth Manusama agrees, citing the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: Article 53 of the Vienna Convention
provides that “a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as
a norm from which no derogation is permitted.” 181 Manusama maintains that
“[t]hese norms are in particular applicable to the United Nations and the
Security Council as part of its international legal personality and international
rights and duties.” 182 De Wet argues that because the Charter is a treaty, the
principle contained in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention applies. 183 Further, it
has been argued that jus cogens cannot be overridden by Article 103.184 As De Wet
notes, the stakes are extremely high: if the Charter can override the peremptory
norms of jus cogens, then “states could instrumentalise the collective security
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system in order to engage in slavery, apartheid or even genocide, provided that
the requisite majority in the Security Council can be secured.” 185
Antonios Tzanakopoulos argues that Article 25 simply does not oblige
states to carry out Chapter VII measures that are ultra vires:
[O]nly those decisions taken in accordance with the Charter, namely intra
vires decisions, are to be accepted and carried out. Ultra vires decisions,
conversely, can lay no claim to binding force. States have specifically agreed
to carry out only those decisions that are in accordance with the Charter.
This may seem trite; it would make little sense if States agreed to be bound
by decisions that are not in accordance with the Charter. 186

Tzanakopoulos maintains that in the face of Security Council measures that are
illegitimate, states are justified in refusing to implement them. He cites an early
commentator on the newly created United Nations, who notes that while there
is no judicial organ that can review the Council’s measures, that does not mean
that the Council has unbounded power, since the United Nations as “an
organization whose various organs and members all have the power to interpret
the basic constitutional instrument without definite legal effect on the other
organs and members can hardly be viable.” 187 Tzanakopoulos maintains that
“[s]tates themselves may proceed to determine the engagement of UN
responsibility.” 188 He says that on occasion, they have done so: “Following up
on their auto-determination of the UN’s responsibility, States have proceeded to
react, in particular by disobeying the Council’s binding commands. In fact,
disobedience has always been championed as the ‘last resort’ if States are faced
with illegal Council non-forcible action under Chapter VII.” 189 Indeed, in his
view, the threat of organized disobedience is “a potent tool for inducing
compliance of a powerful organ with international law.” This is illustrated in the
case of the sanctions on Libya: when the Organization of African Unity refused
to comply any longer with the Council’s sanctions on Libya, “a seven-year
deadlock was miraculously resolved and the sanctions were suspended.” 190
Thus, we have a seen a growing reluctance on the part of international
courts as well as legal scholars to concede the kind of unlimited powers to the
Security Council that were envisioned at its inception. We have also seen an
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increased willingness to openly criticize what courts and scholars see as
overreaching on the Council’s part.

V. C ONCLUSION
In a sense, this is the oldest story in the world: How is power to be limited?
In the seventeenth century, Filmer rejected the theory that government should
be based on the consent of the governed. It is argued, he said, that this would
eliminate arbitrary power, but in truth, there is no power that is not arbitrary.
Whoever it is that rules is either the source of law, with none above him and
none constraining him, or else he is not the ruler, because there is someone else
who is above him. But in either case, at the top there simply is someone with
ultimate power. Filmer argued that whether the holder of that power is a king,
the people, or some other entity, it does not change the fact that ultimate power
is fundamentally arbitrary. 191 It seems that this is at the heart of the dilemma of
whether the Security Council is bound by law: either it holds the highest power
globally, or it does not.
The question of whether the Security Council, which holds such
extraordinary power, is itself bound by law is rooted in the fundamental
contradictions that characterize the design of the Council. At the drafting of the
United Nations Charter, there was on one hand an argument of emergency—
that in the face of aggression, there would be such urgency to respond that any
restraint on the Council posed the risk of crippling it in a moment of crisis. Yet
at the same time, Article 24 was meant to provide a sense of assurance that the
Council would never go terribly astray. The vagueness and ambiguity of Article 1
turned a question of interpretation into a constitutional contradiction: there is a
clause that requires the Council to abide by international law in the context of
peaceful settlements, so why is it absent in the clause about the use of force? Is it
because it was so obviously applicable that there is no need to say it explicitly?
Or is it the exact opposite—that it was deliberately excluded so that, under
Chapter VII, the Council could literally do absolutely anything it wanted? The
answer seems to be that the drafters, or more specifically the Great Powers who
would become the permanent members, wanted the Council’s power to be
unbounded, but it would not have been politically feasible to say this explicitly
and still maintain the broad support of the international community needed for
ratification.
The ambiguity of the document seems tied to a certain sleight of hand: if
the grant of unbounded authority had been stated in such bald terms; no one
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would have consented, other than those who would wield that authority, so at
the beginning there were assurances that this was not really the case. These
assurances were sufficient to stave off outright rejection from those countries
that would never wield this power, and of course, politically, there was little
choice in the matter anyway. But the assurances were vague, as well as lacking
means of enforcement, so that everyone understood they would not ever
amount to much. We see this most vividly with regard to Article 24: the solution
to the political problem was to include Article 24, which seemed to provide
limits on the Council, while actually neither providing any venue with
jurisdiction to hear a complaint that the Council had abused its power nor
establishing an entity with the power to enforce any restraints against the will of
this Leviathan.
Two years later, the bluntness of Kelsen and Dulles is striking. How many
nations would have signed on to the United Nations if it were made explicit that
in restoring peace, the Security Council was not bound by law? With the ink dry
on the document, it seems that there was no longer any need to pretend that the
permanent members considered themselves to be anything other than
unbounded in their powers. But in the context of the broader paralysis of the
Security Council throughout the Cold War, the issue remained dormant for forty
years. It was not until the balance of power shifted so starkly in favor of one of
the permanent members that the theoretical possibility of the Council’s
overreaching in profound and disturbing ways became a reality.
At this juncture, it seems as though the matter is largely resolved. The
political tenor of the Council has shifted, with the balance of power restored in
some degree, such that neither the US nor any other permanent member could
see its will implemented in the Council without opposition, as was the case in
1990 and was largely true until 1993. The refusal of the Council to authorize the
invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a decisive marker in this regard. The negotiations
and compromises that characterize recent Chapter VII measures suggest that,
while there is not opposition of the degree that characterized the Cold War,
neither is there complete compliance with the will of the US or any of the other
permanent members. Consequently, the political balance now is such that the
Council no longer seems susceptible to the kind of unilateralism and
overreaching that took place in the early 1990s.
There are also now voices from venues that were silent or less potent in
the early 1990s. Within the institutions of international law, while there is no
direct judicial review of the Council’s resolutions, there has been a growing
willingness among international and domestic courts to comment upon the
legality of the Council’s actions and to intervene in the implementation of these
measures when they are seen to violate fundamental principles of human or civil
rights. There were few within the international courts who spoke to such
questions in the early 1990s, and those who did were not writing for the court
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but rather in dissents or in separate opinions. There have also been challenges
from the international community, both implicit and explicit, to the Security
Council’s overreaching in other venues. The multiple calls for Security Council
reform, documents such as the report from the High Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change, and expressions of concern and disagreement from the
Secretary-General and the General Assembly, all suggest that there would be
vocal opposition and some amount of political resistance in the event that the
Council were to pursue measures as extreme or controversial as was the case in
the early 1990s. Finally, within legal scholarship, the issue seems to be settled:
the clear consensus is that international human rights law does indeed impose
limits on the Security Council. There is not full consensus on what those limits
are, but there is broad agreement that they are the principles of jus cogens and that
jus cogens at least includes prohibitions on genocide, slavery, and torture.
Filmer might have something to say about this as well. In his critique of
limited monarchy, he argues that there can be no meaningful constitutional
limitations on a monarch. In the end, he says, it all comes down to the question
of who will judge if the king has violated the limits: if the people judge, then it is
not a monarchy; if the monarch judges for himself, then there are no limits. 192
Similarly, Filmer says that neither principles of conscience nor natural law—of
which jus cogens is a variety—can serve as a limit. Natural law and principles of
conscience are in themselves mute. The question is: Who will articulate them? 193
If it is the monarch himself who articulates the limits on his own power, there
will be no limits; if it is the people, then the monarchy is fundamentally
impotent. We cannot avoid this truth: a body that articulates its own limits is a
body that has no limits.
Steven Ratner, referring to “the concern that the Council might act either
beyond its powers under the Charter or in violation of other norms of
international law,” wrote that “[t]his fear reached its zenith in the heady days
after the Cold War when the Council seemed forever unified; today that era
seems but a distant memory.” 194 It seems that Ratner is right. The fear of abuse
of power by the Security Council has been put to rest on several levels.
Politically, a balance of power has been restored to some degree. Legally, it
seems the matter is resolved; the courts and legal scholarship now consistently
recognize that there are limits and largely agree on what those are. But
constitutionally, the matter is not resolved at all. The kind of overreaching that
took place in the early 1990s could occur again. If there were another juncture at
which one of the permanent members exercised the degree of political and
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economic influence that characterized the US in the aftermath of the collapse of
the Soviet Union, the political restraints would evaporate; andthere is no
mechanism for direct, enforceable judicial review. Thus, there will again be the
possibility that the machinery of global governance can be mobilized to
implement the agenda of a single nation, however extreme, absurd, or inhumane
that agenda may be.
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